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ABSTRACT 
State tax expenditures are one of the most important, yet least understood tools policymakers use to 
influence public policy outcomes.  Their costs, almost universally, get little acknowledgement, and their 
effectiveness is rarely evaluated.  This paper established a framework to guide further exploration in this 
area.  910 different economic development and agricultural development tax expenditures across 23 
states were inventoried.  In 2010, within these states, $20.7 billion was spent on economic development 
tax expenditures and $4.1 billion agricultural development tax expenditures; figures that often dwarfed 
values of “above board” programs and funding allocations in state budgets.  Yet, tax expenditure 
effectiveness remains questionable.  For 11 surveyed states with available data for an 11 year period, 
using a 3 Stage Least Squares regression model, controlling for state fixed effects and time, this paper 
found no significant impact of these expenditures were on related outcomes.   
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Chapter I:  Introduction 
Research Objectives 
State tax expenditures are one of the most important, yet least understood, tools policymakers use to 
influence public policy outcomes.  Their costs, almost universally, get little acknowledgement, and their 
effectiveness is rarely evaluated.  Yet, particularly for economic and agricultural development, the 
magnitude of taxpayer support granted through these “below-board” credits, subsidies, deductions, and 
preferential tax treatments, often dwarf the expense of their rigorously challenged and defended 
counterpart programs and departments regularly funded through “above-board” state budgets. 
Accordingly, the goals of this report are threefold: 
1. To set up a framework and rationale for the analysis of economic development and agricultural 
development tax expenditures.  Solid, sharp definitions are essential for reliable, meaningful 
understanding and tracking of tax expenditures over time. 
2. To accurately estimate how much is annually spent by 23 states, including some of our 
country’s largest, on tax expenditures for economic development and agricultural development 
purposes, including, within those categories, how much has been spent in manufacturing and 
biofuels support, respectively.   
3. To explore whether tax expenditures have had a discernible impact on related outcomes 
(economic development or agricultural productivity) for 11 of the 23 states for which reliable 
data is available for an eleven year period, 2000 to 2010. 
However, the mission of this report is broader than just reaching these three objectives.  It is to continue 
a conversation between policymakers, academics, and economic development practitioners, from the 
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state to the federal level about the value and the impact these often hidden expenditures are having on 
our system of government, our budgetary environment, our economy, and our society at-large. 
Introduction 
In 2010, New York State had a budget of approximately $86 billion.  According to the Center for Regional 
Economic Competitiveness’ State Expenditure Database, that year the state spent nearly $300 million on 
economic development activities and programs.  This included line items for the Empire State 
Development Corporation ($45 million), the Foundation for Science, Technology, and Innovation ($68 
million), and the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) ($16.2 
million).  These programs were scrutinized, examined, and justified by administrators that year, and 
every year prior and since, by and to New York’s elected officials.   
Program administrators had to vigorously defend their programs’ effectiveness, justify their costs, and 
explain their plans to make those programs ever-more efficient in addressing their targeted ends.  It was 
through this process of public scrutiny, the measuring and evaluating of expenditures, that the 
determination was made by Governor Andrew Cuomo that an overhaul of the economic development 
system in the state was needed.  Without such scrutiny, new approaches, such as the competitive-
region model, currently being tested, might not have been proposed. 
By comparison, that same year, New York State incurred $1.9 billion worth of economic development 
tax expenditures:  six times more than what was allocated through “above board” economic 
development budgetary line items.  This is a fact largely unknown to most of the state’s general 
population, and even to, presumably, most of its elected officials, despite its enormous, far-reaching 
implications.  These expenditures are rarely part of evaluations of the “economic development” system 
within a state, and often go overlooked in most non-budget related discussions.  Yet their costs and 
potential impact, arguably, are many times that of expenditures that receive much harsher scrutiny. 
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Agricultural producers, similarly, find significant support within both New York’s budget and its tax code.  
In 2010, the Governor Cuomo recommended an allocation of $164.6 million for the state’s Department 
of Agriculture and Markets.  This department of 543 employees is responsible for not only “encouraging 
the growth and economic health of the State’s agricultural and food industry,” but also for protecting 
and marketing to New York’s food consumers.  It is responsible for “conducting various inspections and 
testing programs to enforce laws on food safety, animal and plant health, and accuracy of labeling,”1 the 
preservation and conservation of agricultural resources, and the operation of New York’s massive 
annual State Fair.  In 2010, with the state facing tough economic and fiscal headwinds, the department 
absorbed more than a ten percent cut to its budget. 
Meanwhile, according to our analysis, in 2010, New York State spent, conservatively, $127.7 million on 
agricultural development tax expenditures, up over thirty percent from the previous year, and up 
more than ten percent from two years prior.  These expenditures are ill-controlled, ill-evaluated, and 
can often, as in this case, negate policymakers’ good faith efforts to balance budgets. 
Whether either economic development or agricultural development tax expenditures have resulted in 
provable, positive outcomes is a topic covered later within this report.  But prior to their consideration, 
two questions should be raised: 
1. Between budgetary expenditures and tax expenditures, why is one set of state expenditures 
treated and challenged so differently than the other, despite comparable (or greater) costs to 
the state and its taxpayers? 
2. For firms (or in the case of agriculture, farms) with limited mobility, is tax expenditure support 
the type of financial support necessary to foster their long-term growth in New York?  
                                                          
1
 Department of Agriculture and Markets Budget Presentation, FY2010 - 
http://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy1011archive/eBudget1011/agencyPresentations/pdf/agtmkts.pdf  
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New York State is just one of fifty similar examples found across our country today, with policy-makers 
picking tax “winners” and “losers” through use of the tax code.  This continuing trend makes identifying, 
reviewing, and evaluating the effectiveness of these expenditures across all states imperative, and 
essential to good government policymaking. 
Within this report, we are able to examine the state of tax expenditures across 23 states for one year 
(shown in the table below), and track the economic and agricultural development impacts of 11 states 
over the period 2000 to 2010 (states italicized). 
Figure 1:  States Examined in Tax Expenditure Assessment 
States Examined in Tax Expenditure Assessment 
Arizona Georgia Louisiana New Jersey Pennsylvania 
California Illinois Massachusetts New Mexico Texas 
Colorado Iowa Michigan New York Washington 
Connecticut Kansas Minnesota North Carolina  
Florida Kentucky Montana Ohio  
 
Main Findings 
In 2010, for the 23 states wherein tax expenditure data was reliable and verifiable:   
 Approximately $20.7 billion was spent on economic development tax expenditures, amounting 
to 1.4 cents “spent” on economic development tax expenditures for every dollar of revenue 
collected 
 Over 50 percent of all economic development tax expenditures went to support manufacturing-
related industries 
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 Approximately 39 percent of all economic development tax expenditures  went towards 
supporting investments in “Business Property or Capital” 
 Just over $2 billion was spent to support targeted industries, with the industries differing state 
by state 
 Approximately $4.1 billion was spent on agricultural tax expenditures, with 47 percent of that 
support going towards “Livestock and Crop Inputs” 
For the 11 surveyed states with available and reliable tax expenditure data for the 11 year period, 2000 
through 2010: 
 While the total amount spent on economic development tax expenditures has remained largely 
constant since 2000, spending for these states has shifted away from manufacturing support:  in 
2000, manufacturing-focused tax expenditures made up over two-thirds of economic 
development tax expenditure spending, but by 2010, for these states, it dropped to 43 percent   
 “Research and Development” tax expenditure spending, since 2000, was up by over 133 
percent, while “Enterprise Zone” and geographically-targeted expenditure spending was up by 
353 percent 
 From 2000 to 2010, state spending on agricultural development tax expenditures have 
increased nearly fifty percent, from $1.26 billion in 2000 to $1.86 billion in 2010 
 State biofuel tax expenditure spending peaked in 2008, accounting for 9.4 percent ($147.3 
million) of agricultural development expenditures 
Further, for these 11 states, based upon a state-by-state three step-least-squares (3SLS) instrumental 
variable regression model, the following tax expenditure impacts were found: 
 Our regressions found no impact, all else held equal, of corporate tax rates (TCorpInc) on 
number of large (Firms100) in a state  
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 Taxes on those individuals making over $100,000 was not found to have a significant impact on 
the number of large firms within this sample of states 
 Sales taxes (Tsales) were, however, found to have a significant impact on the number of large 
firms within a state 
 States with greater percentages of an employed population and those with a higher average 
workforce wage also had greater numbers of large firms 
 Republican control of the Executive branch of a state did have a minimal, but significant impact 
on the number of large firms within the state 
 The amount spent on economic development tax expenditures, our variable of interest, was also 
found to be insignificant 
 Every percent increase in crop and livestock revenue resulted in a 1.14 percent increase in farm 
income 
 A full Republican controlled Executive branch and legislature was found to have a positive 
impact on farm income 
 States with a higher density of Interstate, unlike within economic development, did show a 
positive effect on agricultural development outcomes through farm profits 
 Farm size, expectedly, was positively correlated with crop and livestock revenue 
 Agricultural development tax expenditures were not found to have a significant impact on 
agricultural revenues (in this case, our proxy for agricultural economic development) when state 
effects were taken into account 
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Chapter II:  State Tax Expenditures Explained 
Understanding State Tax Expenditures 
Tax expenditures are reductions or refunds of taxes from a baseline tax level.  They include tax credits 
(e.g. first time home-buyers’ tax credit), deductions (e.g. charitable giving), exemptions (e.g. basic food 
stuffs), and preferential tax rates (e.g. capital purchases given a lower tax rate).  Tax expenditures 
amount to money removed from revenue streams before those streams “pour” into a budgetary pool, 
from which, then, governmental departments, programs, and initiatives receive funding. 
At the federal level, tax expenditures have been given significant consideration since the publication of 
the seminal 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, wherein tax expenditures were 
first legislatively defined: 
“The term ‘tax expenditures’ means those revenue losses attributable to provisions of 
the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross 
income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax 
liability, and the term ‘tax expenditures budget’ means an enumeration of such tax 
expenditures.”2 
The evaluation of federal expenditures is now a standard part of the government’s operating 
procedures, with Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation3 regularly releasing updates on their costs.  In 
2010, the Committee estimated that federal tax expenditures for individuals and corporations exceeded 
$1 trillion. 
Thanks to organizations such as the Pew Charitable Trusts and their SubsidyScope program, and the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, it is easier than ever for policymakers and taxpayers to 
                                                          
2
 “Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.”  Page 508. 
3
 https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4386  
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understand where federal tax expenditure dollars are going.  In 2010, for instance, according to 
SubsidyScope’s analysis of the Joint Committee on Taxation’s report4, $360 billion was allocated for 
“Commerce and Housing” purposes; another $208 billion was for “Income Security”; and $5.3 billion 
went directly to “Community and Regional Development.”5  This transparency has enabled the regular 
production of governmental, think tank, and academic reports each year evaluating the efficacy, 
fairness, and effectiveness of these expenditures. 
At the state level, however, the transparency comparison could not be starker.  According to the Pew 
Center on the States’ 2012 report, “Evidence Counts:   Evaluating State Tax Incentives for Jobs and 
Growth”6, only 13 states were “leading the way” in opening their “tax expenditure books,” “meeting 
both criteria for scope of [their] evaluation and/or both criteria for quality of information.”  Another 12 
states had “mixed results,” “meeting only one of the criteria for scope and/or quality of evaluation.”  26 
states, more than half the states in America, were “not meeting any of the criteria for scope or quality of 
evaluation.” 
Research done for this report largely supports what the Pew Center on the States concluded:  that states 
have, generously, a mixed record on tracking, assessing, evaluating, and/or disclosing their annual tax 
expenditures.  Most states, even those selected for use within this report’s analyses, lack at least a 
handful of major tax expenditures within their reports, whether through full omission or through non-
disclosure of total credit amounts.  This missing data may result in understatements of tax expenditure 
totals. 
                                                          
4
 http://subsidyscope.org/tax_expenditures/summary/  
5
 Though it should be noted that this is not a one-to-one comparison with our economic development tax 
expenditure definitions, which, as later discussed, includes job creation and training programs, technology 
investment incentives, and other items, which are included in several various SubsidyScope categories.   
6
 http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/evidence-counts-85899378806  
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Encouragingly, however, more states appear to be releasing their tax expenditure data, perhaps just 
now setting up internal programs themselves to compile and track these expenses. 
The Impact of State Tax Expenditures 
Understanding what tax expenditures are is critical to comprehending their costs (report objective two), 
as well as to setting up a proper framework (objective one) to begin to rigorously challenge their 
intended economic and agricultural impacts (objective three).  Unlike their “above-board” budgetary 
programmatic and departmental line items though, the impacts of these hidden expenditures can be far 
greater than simply foregone revenue. 
Nearly every state, excluding Vermont, unlike the federal government, is required to annually balance its 
budget.  To again use New York State as an example, in 2010, the state had a budget of $86 billion.  This 
figure represented the approximate sum of all the revenues the state expected to collect equal to (or 
hopefully greater than) the amount of the budgetary expenditures it was expecting to allocate out.  If 
expenses were to unexpectedly rise or revenues unexpectedly decline, the broken equilibrium would 
require either items to be cut, new revenues to be raised, or monies to be pulled from “rainy day” 
funds.  In other words, unlike at the federal level, consistent deficit-driven borrowing is not feasible, 
making the impact of tax expenditures that much greater.   
Tax expenditures impact the state budgetary environment in two primary ways: 
1. Most directly, by governing the amount of revenues entering state coffers; and 
2. With their individual variability, adding uncertainty to revenue projections, a critical budgetary 
process. 
Assuming a balanced budget environment, both of these can have substantial implications on state 
budgets, and ultimately, on the distribution of the tax burden.   
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To the first point, tax expenditures divert money away from being collected and used by the state.  
After passing new, special tax treatment bills to chosen persons, industries, firms, or individuals, the 
state, budget already set, must then pay for the introduced gap:   between the expenditures that are 
still demanded and the new amount of expected revenue to-be collected.  This can be achieved either 
through higher taxes on those not receiving preferential treatment or through cutting above-board 
programs and services7, assuming a balanced budget. 
If achieved through higher tax rates elsewhere, tax expenditures will wind up serving both as an 
incentive (to the targeted industry) and well as a disincentive (to those not targeted, but who would 
wind up paying a higher tax rate).  If achieved through cutting budgetary programs and services, tax 
expenditures would have an ironic deleterious impact on those programs that have been far more 
heavily evaluated for their effectiveness, efficacy, and efficiency.  State tax expenditures are paid for 
through higher tax burdens on those not receiving preferential tax treatments and/or through agency 
or programmatic cuts.   
To the second concern with tax expenditures, state budgets, fundamentally, are based upon a set of 
assumptions and projections, particularly about the level of revenues to be collected year-to-year.  
Economic variations, industry slumps, population shifts, and even the weather can play significant 
factors in whether a state raises the level of revenue it expects, and needs, from its citizenry and its 
enterprises during any given year8.  Tax expenditures add another portfolio of variables to weigh, 
understand, and project when making these estimations.  Not fully understanding the impact of even 
                                                          
7
 As a side note, this is why the “Grover Norquist” pledge taken by politicians, to never raise taxes, also precludes 
the cutting of tax expenditures.  Doing so would, in effect, allow more money to flow into state coffers, as opposed 
to creating a “starved” budget environment wherein the only option, given the pledge, would be to cut spending 
to achieve equilibrium.  Further, in consideration of the argument that future growth would result in higher tax 
revenues, for our focus herein, we are just considering the reality of the next budgetary fiscal year:  within that 
next year resulting industry growth would far from make up the gap in revenues. 
8
 States also receive a significant amount of revenue from the federal government annually 
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one of these tax expenditures can have significant budget consequences, a cost that is hard to quantify, 
but one that is undeniably substantial. 
A 2011 report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities highlighted two such instances9: 
“In 1989, Georgia passed a law exempting video tape rentals from sales tax.  This exemption 
currently costs the state more than $4 million per year...  The exemption is permanent, so there 
is no requirement that policymakers even reconsider whether it is a good use of state dollars.  
Nor is there evidence that policymakers even have reviewed it.” 
“In 2000, Arizona passed a tax credit for vehicles that [could] run on alternative fuels.  The state 
estimated that the credit, which paid up to half of the vehicle’s cost, would cost $3 million to 
$10 million per year.  In its first year, however, the credit cost the state $680 million before the 
legislature could repeal it.” 
Tax expenditures have the potential to be highly variable from year-to-year (particularly given added 
complexities with refundability and carry-over provisions), can cost a great deal, and can be virtually 
hidden from regular public and even policy-maker scrutiny.  In other words, their annual costs are hard 
to project, can be substantial, and can far exceed projections before states can appropriately review and 
adjust.  Tax expenditures make the normal budgetary process that much more difficult to manage. 
Additional Tax Expenditure Consequences 
Beyond state budgetary consequences, tax expenditures have other repercussions on the marketplace.   
State legislatures, for decades, have used tax expenditures to incentivize the purchase of items, such as 
hybrid cars, to promote a social or environmental good:  to achieve a particular policy end.  In fact, many 
of the economic and agricultural development incentives examined herein were established to achieve 
                                                          
9
 http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-11-11sfp.pdf  
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some social and/or economic goal.  Community development credits and enterprise zones, for example, 
were not only designed to economically revitalize an area, but also to reenergize and build communities.   
However, policy-maker led interventions that incentivize individual actions/ activities, by their nature, 
disincentive others, potentially resulting in unintended consequences or long-term, economic, sub-
optimal results.  For instance, subsidizing fuel for particular types of production could, while making 
production more cost-competitive in the short-term (at least until other states follow suit), result in 
industries not modernizing and investing in capital at a rate which would make them more long-term 
competitive. 
Also disturbing is the perversity that could arise not from the marketplace consumers and producers, 
but from the “consumer-state” itself.  By the nature of our republic, each state, in effect, operates in a 
competitive environment with all other states to, among other things, grow and attract industry and 
commerce, bringing jobs, tax revenue, and political riches.  Tax expenditures create an inter-state 
dynamic wherein states, especially in tough economic environments, as “consumers” of industry, 
demanders of mega-institutions and the jobs they would inject, are forced to bid against one another to 
attract these large, mobile firms.  The dynamic, ultimately, creates a classic “race to the bottom” 
scenario, where states bid down any potential direct tax revenue they would collect from businesses 
that are prepared to – presumably, regardless of the state – open up shop.   
These additional consequences of state tax expenditures are not stated solely to paint a negative 
portrait of their usefulness in reaching policy ends; there are, no doubt, many such tax expenditures that 
have far surpassed their economic and/or social goals, perhaps even many times “paying back” their 
cost through subsequent industry growth (as we will discuss within the next “theory” section).  The 
highlighting of these consequences, however, is meant to illustrate that without proper and transparent 
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methods for accounting for the costs of tax expenditures, it is virtually impossible to understand and 
wield these powerful policy tools.   
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The Economic Rationale behind Tax Expenditures 
In May 2011, in Owensboro, Kentucky, a developer was granted up to $5 million in state tax incentives 
to build a Hampton Inn & Suites in the city’s downtown.  The package, granted by the Kentucky Tourism 
Development Finance Authority, would defer up to 25% the $20.3 million cost of the 150-room hotel 
through sales tax refunds.  “It’s wonderful for Owensboro and the convention business,” the developer 
professed10.  The developer also “struck a deal with [the city of] Owensboro in which the hotel isn’t 
required to pay city property taxes in any year in its first 10 that averages less than 65% occupancy.”11  
This investment was one of many to support the city’s master plan, reinvesting in its downtown and 
“capitalizing on Kentucky’s musical heritage and Owensboro’s annual blue-grass festival.”12  
In this city of 56,000, with an unemployment rate of 9 percent, and per capita income at slightly over 
$33,000, policy-makers offered such incentives to foster new industry, encourage downtown 
reinvestment, and attract much needed jobs.  They likely turned to such incentives because these tools, 
in practice, are what have been used before and what are used by their competitors.  However, there is 
significant economic theory behind the original use of such incentives to generate economic growth. 
Theory for tax incentives originate with broader, well-worn economic concepts.  John Maynard Keynes, 
in his seminal work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, presented the basic 
rationale behind why producers choose to invest in capital (such as, in the aforementioned example, the 
building of a new hotel): 
“When a man buys an investment or capital-asset, he purchases the right to the series 
of prospective returns, which he expects to obtain from selling its output, after 
                                                          
10
 Vied, Steve.  “State OKs Hotel Incentives.” 
11
 Hudson, Kris. 
12
 Thomson, Susan. 
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deducting the running expenses of obtaining that output, during the life of the 
asset…[this is] the prospective yield of the investment.”13  
Tax expenditures, effectively, reduce the cost or “running expenses” of such investments, thereby 
inducing producers to, according to Keynesian thinking, purchase more of those assets.   
In Owensboro, it lowered the cost of building the hotel from over $20 million to closer to $15 million, 
over the ten year period.   
Keynes also noted that two types of risk impacted the “volume of investment”, which are relevant to 
our conversation:  borrower’s risk and lender’s risk.  Borrower’s risk, quite simply, is “the probability of 
[the entrepreneur, in this case the developer,] earning the prospective yield for which he hopes.”14  The 
lender’s risk, if lending is necessary, stems from moral hazard or “the possible insufficiency of the 
margin of security”. 
Tax expenditures – and, in fact, most direct economic development expenditures – work to remove such 
risk from both the borrower and the lender by either reducing the initial or ongoing cost of a project, as 
was the case with Owensboro’s conditional tax breaks, or by simply shifting the risk to the government 
itself, as with government loan guarantees.   
States, cities, and communities engage in such market-influencing behavior for, among many reasons, 
two prominent, theoretical ones, each backed with long histories of research:  multiplier effects and 
location theory.   
                                                          
13
 Keynes, John Maynard. 123. 
14
 Keynes, John Maynard.  129.  
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 The theory of multiplier effects, or Keynesian multiplier effects, actually comes from one of Keynes’ 
students, Richard Kahn.  In discussing the benefits of constructing a road, he notes how the economic 
effects extend beyond the direct, attributable ones: 
“The increased employment that is required in connection actually with the increased 
investment will be described as the ‘primary’ employment.  It includes the ‘direct’ 
employment, and also, of course, the ‘indirect’ employment that is set up in the 
production and transport of the raw materials required for making the new investment.  
To meet the increased expenditure of wages and profits that is associates with the 
primary employment, the production of consumption-goods is increased.  Here again 
wages and profits are increased, and the effect will be passed on, though with 
diminished intensity.  And so on ad infinitum.  The total employment that is set up in 
this way in the production of consumption-goods will be termed the ‘secondary’ 
employment.  The ratio of secondary to primary employment is a measure of these 
‘beneficial repercussions’ that are so often referred to.”15 
These “beneficial repercussions” or what went on to become known as “multiplier effects,” drive many 
of the arguments made for and behind the use of tax expenditures.  Combining this with Keynes’ 
economic framework, the often costly investments made by municipalities to lower the cost of business 
investment will not only result in greater employment within the firm, but will multiply to greater 
employment within the area itself. 
To put this in context, let’s return to the Owensboro example.  If 100 jobs were created from the 
Hampton Inn & Suites project, the $5 million investment alone would equate to a per job subsidy of 
$50,000 per job (over the ten years).  With most of these workers likely making considerably less than 
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$50,000 per year, the City of Owensboro would essentially be covering staff costs for well over a year.  
Such an investment was made, however, not just to create those jobs within the hotel, but rather, to 
induce additional spending and investment within the community. 
 Owensboro officials estimated that, with the dozen or more such projects and investments taking place 
within its downtown, the city would feel an “economic impact” of $1.3 billion, based on “standard 
economic impact multipliers.”16  Beyond the direct and indirect effects of investments, such as the 
$425.5 million being spent on the Owensboro Medical Health System’s hospital construction project, 
and the “beneficial repercussions” referred to by Kahn, creating “secondary” jobs, Owensboro officials 
are also counting on another type of multiplier impact:  spill-over effects. 
E.J. Mishan summarizes the evolution of the “spill-over effect” or positive externalities in his 1971 
article, “The Postwar Literature on Externalities”.  Responding to the increasing intersection of economic 
and social theory during the period – while self-depreciatingly pointing out that “economists respond to 
real world problems with a time lag” – Mishan pushed the earlier theories set-up in Marshall’s 
Principles, Pigou’s Economics of Welfare, and R.F. Kahn’s work to encompass a type of multiplier 
condition of “spillovers” (for his interest, specifically, environmental spillovers).  Using a welfare 
economic analysis, Mishan purported that: 
“In popular expositions, an external effect is commonly defined in terms of the response 
of a firm’s output, or a person’s utility, to the activity of others.  Insofar as the standard 
smoke and noise examples are cited, the correct impression is conveyed.  This casual 
definition is unsatisfactory…some further light is shed on the nature of an externality by 
the notion of ‘internalizing’ it.  If the effluent of an upstream firm damages the product 
of a downstream firm, a merger of the two firms will internalize the spillover- for the 
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upstream branch of the new firm has now to adjust its output in the light of the damage 
its effluent causes to the downstream firm.” 
Beyond multiplier effects, the very combination of firms and the ways industry is aligned can result in 
stronger economic outcomes through positive externalities.  Mishan notes the “classic solution” for 
achieving an “optimal output”, the “tax/subsidy solution.”17  His important, summative work - 
connecting government purpose in industry organization - arose during a period where economists also 
began to explore the economic potential of agglomeration economies, industrial economics, and 
industry clusters18, which set the stage for the regular government intervention into private markets 
that we see today.   
In full, this theoretical work left practitioners and policy-makers with a few key take-aways related to 
private sector investments: 
 Investments that lead to hiring will have a multiplied impact, given how those hired will also 
consume, spurring additional demand; 
 Investments can impact a system, not only of economies and industries, but of social “goods” 
and ends – and impacting that system can lead to other, positive and desired externalities, 
whether it is better environmental outcomes or further industry growth. 
This literature, which we, by virtue of our purposes herein, give only a cursory treatment, did have a 
lasting impact on the way the public sector views the private sector and its potential role, at various 
points, to foster the private sector’s well-being.  It was carried on, and was brought into a more applied 
context, by Michael Porter and Paul Krugman19 in their influential work on regional development. 
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Location theory, another factor driving government support of such programs as tax expenditures, has 
also long been at the backbone of economic literature with strands running as far back as David Ricardo 
and his On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817.  Location theory, in effect, puts forth 
that there are reasons why economic activity takes place in one location over another.  From Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage, to Johann Heinrich von Thunen’s addendum of transportation costs 
reducing the economic rents able to be garnered by producers20, an entire literature was created around 
the dynamics that cause firms – and economies – to move.   
Douglass North, in 1955, recognizing the importance of the work and its implications, in particular, for 
the United States and regional economic development, began to use these theories as a lens through 
which one could view the American system: 
“During the past several decades there has been a growing interest in location theory in 
America.  Building on the pioneering works of Thunen, Weber, Losch, Palander, and 
others, a number of economists and geographers have extended the analysis to apply to 
a wide range of problems and have attempted to synthesize location theory with other 
fields of economics.  However, very little work has been done in using the principles of 
location of analyze the historical growth of regions in America.”21 
Within his paper - wherein he outlines a “sequence” of development for American regions, from a 
subsistence economy, to one focused on transportation investments, to trader, to a move from 
agriculture to industrialization, to exporter of manufactured goods – he puts forth a few important 
guiding concepts which took hold, both in the literature and practice: 
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1. “For economists’ purposes the concept of a region should be redefined to point out that the 
unifying cohesion to a region, over and beyond geographic similarities, is its development 
around a common export base.”22 
2. “The importance of the export base is a result of its primary role in determining the level of 
absolute and per capita income in a region, and therefore in determining the amount of 
residentiary secondary and tertiary activity that will develop.  The export base has also 
significantly influenced the character of subsidiary industry, the distribution of population and 
pattern of urbanization, the character of the labor force, the social and political attitudes of the 
region, and its sensitivity to fluctuations of income and employment.” 
3. “The role of the state and federal government in creating social overhead benefits has created 
new exports in many regions.”23 
In summary, he presented a case for:  regions to be, to some extent, defined by the industries within it; 
the development of export-oriented industries not just for their direct effects, but for their multiplier 
effects, and their potential impact on the area or region itself; and finally, and perhaps most critically, 
the role of government, through both indirect and direct manners, in creating such new industries.  This 
philosophy of economic governance, often referred to as industrial economic policy, and has been at the 
cornerstone of economic policymaking, especially in European countries, for much of the past century. 
However, also within his paper, ironically, exists echoes of other, countering trains of thought:  theories 
and ideas put forth that run counter not only to what North, himself, is proposing, but also Mishan, 
Kahn, and even Keynes, at least as related to the government’s role (and effectiveness) in fostering 
private sector development through tax expenditures.  He notes:  “Footloose industries, where transfer 
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costs are not of significant importance in location.  A great many such industries develop purely by 
chance in some location.”24 
This statement is supported by an equally lengthy and worthy segment of economic thought and theory 
that beg two questions, at simplest:  1) do most large “footloose” firms, for which transportation costs 
are not a large factor, develop “by chance”, despite the often heard protestations of business advocacy 
groups?, and 2) given how small the percentage of firms is that states  “compete” to attract, as 
compared to the number of firms they currently host, are the incentive packages offered actually cost 
effective?  
In the case of Owensboro, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis25, federal funds and such 
incentive packages (as well as tax increases on citizens) will “generate 9,000 jobs over the next three to 
five years,” including many of those spillover effects, as the downtown becomes a “premier destination 
for citizens to live, work and play.”26  Such stories and expectations have played out, often to 
tremendous success and publicity.  But another segment of these investments (to be left to the reader 
to determine whether this segment is in the majority or not and to what effect), have not had the 
economic impact otherwise predicted.  Countering economic theories may help us to explain why. 
In 1957, economist Milton Friedman proposed a theory known as the “permanent income hypothesis”.  
Per his proposition, counter to Keynes’ basic premise of “inducement”, consumers and firms will only 
spend differently if they know that the change in income or costs they are experiencing will be a 
permanent change.  In other words, if a firm’s leadership is aware that a particular tax credit will be 
expiring or a grant will only cover one-time costs, it will not significantly change how much it will invest 
after settling in or how many it will hire.  Per Friedman: 
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“Some of the most strikingly uniform characteristics of computer regressions between 
consumption and income are simply a reflection of the inadequacy of measured income 
as an indicator of long-run income status…differences among various groups of 
consumer units in observed marginal propensities to consume may not reflect 
differences in underlying preferences for consumption and wealth at all.”27 
Thus, municipalities looking to induce investment or job creation through short-term perks or incentives 
may simply be giving up revenues for little to no return.  Further, municipalities may be competing to 
provide these incentive packages, while firms, for permanent location purposes, may only be worried 
about the basic economic factors they need for their businesses on an on-going basis; factors such as 
overall tax rates, the quality and price of the workforce, access to markets, and other input prices (e.g. 
energy).  Short-term tax breaks, or longer term ones which have sunset clauses (e.g. PILOTs) or those 
that may face repeal in an uncertain political environment, may be great to bolster short-term income, 
but may not actually drive long-term firm location decisions.  In other words, firms may make decisions 
based on long-term factors besides economic development (or agricultural development) tax incentives, 
though may fight for the largest short-term package of such incentives when their decisions are already 
made. 
An additional economic concern that ran counter to Keynesian thought that rose to prominence through 
the twentieth century in the United States, driving global movements towards deregulation in the 
1980s, was about the role of government in the private sector.  “Government failure, it was argued, was 
just as pervasive as market failure”28.  Policy-makers selecting “winners”, such as through the tax code, 
was shown to result in often less that “pareto efficient” outcomes.   
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Celebrated economist Paul Krugman was not blind to these dangers, despite his earlier work in favor of 
it, as he mentions in some of his later work29: 
“The key question [for Krugman in his work is] over the promotion of regional industrial 
specialization is whether the potential advantages are outweighed by the likelihood of 
greater regional instability and shocks, and the risk of structural depression…for the 
case of Massachusetts, regional industrial specialization is a double-edged sword:  it can 
be the basis of a high rate of export-led local economic growth in one period, but the 
source of prolonger local economic depression if that demand subsequently collapses or 
is captured by other competing regions.” 
In other words, policy-makers, by the end of the century, had the power and precedent to influence 
market outcomes, but still did not – and never will – have all the information they need to select the 
“right” industries to support.  Policy-makers are also ill-equipped to determine whether to support one, 
two, or more industries – supporting diversification over specialization – and, in a catch-22, lack the 
evaluations necessary to determine the best tools to use to do so. 
The theoretical debates around the role of government in the economy and the long-term effectiveness 
of policy-mechanisms, such as tax expenditures, remain active, with equally strong voices on each side.  
However, practitioners continue to use these tools under the assumption and precedence of their 
effectiveness.  This paper hopes to empirically examine whether clear answers are possible. 
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The Literature on Agricultural Development Incentives 
Agricultural development incentives are, by the nature of their industry, different than those designed 
to target and promote manufacturing, for example.  Instead of states “competing” for large, mobile 
farms, they are instead “competing” to preserve the vitality of industries that are not only economically 
important to them and their citizens, but also that generate a level of state-pride not often seen within 
other industries.  The “family farm” is an almost mythical symbol in the American zeitgeist with few 
other industry comparisons. 
Given agriculture’s inherent differences, the goals of agricultural incentives are different (while much of 
the base theory and motivations, as previously discussed, remains constant).  Agricultural development 
incentives largely fall into two categories:  1) Value-added industry supports; and 2) Farm income and 
revenue supports.  Value-added industry supports often directly focus on developing value-added 
industries (e.g. biofuels, food manufacturing) to indirectly support farmers, by developing new, local 
markets for their products (i.e. yogurt manufacturing in Upstate New York).  Farm income and revenue 
supports, provide more direct support, often through “above-board” U.S. Farm Bill and other statewide 
support programs, that take such actions as placing floors on crop prices and providing subsidies on 
other crop production, as well as through reducing the costs for production itself.   
Tax expenditures largely fall into the “value-added industry supports” category (which follow the same 
economic theories as discussed earlier), as well as the cost reduction sub-category of “income and 
revenue supports.”  To this latter point, whereby states tend to focus on increasing existing industry 
income, over providing “attraction incentives,” we wish to take a moment to highlight one of the largest 
tax expenditures granted within this area, and the rationale behind it. 
One of, if not the largest, agricultural development tax expenditures in the United States is for the 
preferential tax treatment of land.  “Over 60 percent of the private land in the 48 contiguous states of 
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the U.S. is in farms and ranches”30; 75 percent of a farm’s assets are land; and “approximately one-fifth 
of the agricultural return to agricultural land is paid in real property taxes.”  Impacting the cost of this 
key input for farmers directly impacts their bottom-line, and thereby impacts the industry’s vitality 
within each state31. 
States have, accordingly, recognizing the industry’s importance, promoted targeted tax expenditures in 
this area.  All 50 states have some preferential tax treatment for agricultural land32. 
These preferential tax rates result in lower assessed land values and taxes collected, as states try to 
preserve this existing industry within its borders.  The economic rational for supporting such “firms” 
without mobility is one worthy of question, and belies our simultaneous evaluation of agricultural 
development tax expenditures besides economic development tax expenditures within this report.  
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The Literature on the Impacts of State Tax Expenditures 
Academic and professional publications have long challenged the effectiveness of state tax expenditures 
to achieve economic development outcomes.  Many have made attempts, sometimes successfully, to 
identify and inventory the number and depth of tax expenditures.  Others have taken it further, either 
focusing on a select set of states or particular cross-state incentives (e.g. R&D tax credits) to test 
incentive effectiveness – though most studies appear to have tested effectiveness on the characteristics 
and generosity of the expenditures (i.e. the percentage of the tax break on research and development 
equipment versus the amount of research and development equipment “induced” to be purchased), not 
necessarily on the amount actually disbursed or spent by the state on these incentives.   
A number of academics and reporters have also documented the externalities, or unintended 
consequences, of these incentives, on state budgets, on generating a national “race to the bottom,” and 
on the general shifting of the tax burden.  In this section, we will briefly survey the literature that has, 
to-date, attempted to inventory tax expenditures across states, and provide a brief view of the literature 
available that relates to the impact of these expenditures.  For a complete list of articles and 
publications cited and reviewed in the process of writing this report, please see the Bibliography. 
Inventories 
In a ground-breaking piece released during the production of this paper, the New York Times declared 
the following: 
“A Times investigation has examined and tallied thousands of local incentives granted 
nationwide and has found that states, counties and cities are giving up more than $80 
billion each year to companies. The beneficiaries come from virtually every corner of the 
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corporate world, encompassing oil and coal conglomerates, technology and 
entertainment companies, banks and big-box retail chains.”33 
In its extensive investigation, similar, though not congruent, to the one carried out in this report, the 
Times:  “analyzed more than 150,000 awards and created a searchable database of incentive spending. 
The survey was supplemented by interviews with more than 100 officials in government and business 
organizations as well as corporate executives and consultants.”  It found that “Texas awards more 
incentives, over $19 billion a year, than any other state. Alaska, West Virginia and Nebraska give up the 
most per resident.” 
Similarly, this report also found Texas to have the highest state economic development/ business 
incentive tax credits, though at a much smaller $2.2 billion valuation (if a large, arguable tax credit is 
included, this increases to $12 billion).  This is due, in part, to a broader NYTimes definition of tax 
incentives, and their use of FY2013 information (this information was gathered for this report, but to 
maintain an accurate state-by-state comparison, 2010 was used as the comparative year across states).  
The NYTimes also appears to have estimated and compared unlike years, using data not publically 
available, as most states still do not maintain comprehensive, accurate tax expenditure information, as 
discussed earlier in this report. 
Other reports and papers have similarly attempted to compile an inventory of state tax expenditures, 
though the NYTimes’ work is certainly, henceforth, the watermark.   
Impact 
“The New Hampshire legislature voted in favor of a R&D tax credit in the spring of 2007 
and the legislative bill was signed by the Governor and then became law in the fall of 
2007.  Economic considerations…influenced the legislative discussions and the creation 
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of the R&D tax credit in New Hampshire…There is significant evidence that nations and 
states that adopt an R&D tax credit will experience an increase in R&D investments.  The 
New Hampshire modeling and simulations are consistent with these findings and those 
that a R&D tax credit policy can have positive impact on employment and income 
growth.”34 
Tax expenditures across the United States – at the federal, state, and local levels – are regularly used to 
influence economic and agricultural development outcomes.  R&D tax credits, as mentioned above, are 
just among the most common, though, as shall be discussed later, represent just a small percentage of 
those credits available. 
The literature on the effectiveness of tax expenditures is mixed, and in evaluating many of the broader, 
less popular credits (such as manufacturing sales tax exemptions), sparse.  The New England Public 
Policy Center in late 2009 pulled together a broad survey of the literature.  Within it, they presented a 
strong case where “results clearly suggest that state investment tax credits are effective in generating 
capital investment – their targeted activity – and estimate the average magnitude of that effect.  
[economists, Chirinko and Wilson, in their multiple regression study] also found evidence that a state is 
likely to draw at least some portion of the new capital investment away from other states.”35  The 
Center presents this, however, with the caveat that such cross-state studies often don’t account for 
what would happen within any individual state.   
At the individual state level, the results again are mixed, and depend upon whether investment tax 
credits, R&D credits, or film credits are being evaluated, for example, and within which state.  North 
Carolina’s M&E credit, according to a 2003 assessment, resulted in “firms invest[ing] about $12.3 billion 
in qualified machinery and equipment…generating close to $860 million in tax credits over the 
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program’s first six years… each dollar of M&E [actually claimed though] was associated with $106 in 
capital investment,”36 a clear win.   
However, in Rhode Island, a 2000 study of the state’s film credit would that “for every dollar spent on 
film tax credits, the [Rhode Island] government recoup[erated] $0.28 to $0.32 in new revenue from 
direct economic effects…[and] the authors also did not attempt to adjust for any film activity that might 
have occurred without the credit.”   
A number of other academic publications and papers confirm these mixed results37.  Yet, states, to both 
remain competitive and chase the “big win” (such as the mid-1990s South Carolina model of attracting 
1,400 new businesses and creating 200,000 new jobs through the use of tax expenditures38), continue to 
develop and implement expenditures, and do so within linking them to proper evaluations39.   
This paper hopes to continue the growing discussion about state-level tax expenditure effectiveness. 
(Not) Understanding Tax Expenditures 
Measuring the basic financial impact of tax expenditures, as done within this report, is far from a simple 
or easy task.  As previously mentioned, states have not been entirely forthcoming with their tax 
expenditure data, providing an initial, critical hurdle.  However, accessibility is only one reason the cost 
of tax expenditures are hard to accurately determine.  Others include: 
 A “tax expenditure” dollar is not necessarily equal to a dollar budgeted for a government 
program.  For instance, if new manufacturing capital is taxed at a lower rate than other 
purchases, that difference, between what would have been collected at the “normal” rate, and 
what was collected, is not necessarily a one-to-one comparison.  At the normal, higher tax rate, 
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business consumers would be faced with a higher product cost, and would, therefore, purchase 
a lower quantity.  This lower quantity purchased would result in lower tax revenue than that 
assumed by simply multiplying the number of entities claiming the tax credit and multiplying it 
by the average tax credit amount.  Thus, determining the exact amount “spent” or given up on 
individual tax expenditures is an estimate, at best. 
 “Normal” or base tax rates are different from state to state, and even from item to item.  
While some states, such as Montana or New Mexico, might have lower amounts of declared tax 
credits, even accounting for industry size, their base tax rates might be lower than others, like 
New York or California.  Simply comparing totals from one to another to determine which states 
have the lowest cost of doing business would be misleading.  Additionally, even within states, 
tax expenditures take away from tax revenue streams based upon different rates.  For instance, 
states tax individual income, corporate income, and sales taxes at different levels; further, some 
states also tax fuel use, mineral extraction, and basic industry-sector activities at different rates.  
Where they do, analysts must make the choice, given available data to either:  1. Inventory 
these different rates, then account for the tax expenditure departures from that “normal;” or 2. 
Determine a standard “normal” tax rate across all sectors, and calculate how these structural 
preferences deviate from that.  Later, within this report’s regression analyses on the potential 
impact of tax expenditures, we try to, to our best, account for these base tax variations. 
 Again, tax expenditure costs are estimates and are subject to change.  Agencies actively submit 
departmental and program budgets annually.  States then publish these requests, to varying 
levels of detail.  Tax expenditures, on the other hand, require time to calculate, and then are 
only an approximation, at best.  State revenue departments can count the number of individuals 
and enterprises taking advantage of various tax credits and deductions, and then multiply that 
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by the average credit or deduction taken; but even then, late tax filers and carry-overs can cause 
those numbers to retro-actively change. 
Further, many policymakers at the state government level may also have their own incentives not to 
share this information: 
 Tax expenditures and their implications can be difficult to understand and explain.  Openly 
debating the estimated costs of expenditures “paid for” with funds that are often never actually 
collected, often requires explanation.  Making cases for or against such expenditures, especially 
given the political ambiguity as to whether it would amount to an increase in taxes, is not a 
straightforward task, and carries with it its own political dangers. 
 Perhaps for competitive purposes, states have historically been reticent to publically release 
their tax expenditure information.  Of the 23 states surveyed for this report, for instance, only 
two had any sort of reliable information available online in 1999.  However, thanks to the work 
of organizations like the Pew Center on the States, and a large public-accountability and 
transparency movement over the past decade, more states than ever are releasing this 
information.  By 2003, as shown in Chapter 3 of this report, 10 of the 23 states surveyed had 
information readily available; and by 2010, 20 of the 23.  That said, even by 2010, “released” 
information had still had significant limitations:  all of the data was released in analytically 
inaccessible PDF form (versus Excel); only a handful of states had consistent information on 
individual tax expenditures extending back more than two years; three of the states had data 
that was massively incomplete and unusable; and, as aforementioned, even many of Pew’s 
“leading the way” states did not inventory and capture the expenses of various large and 
important tax expenditure items.   
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These limitations should be kept in mind when reviewing any tax expenditure information, including 
those presented in this report. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
For this report, dozens of previous reports, articles, and scholarly publications – on both federal and 
state tax expenditures - were reviewed (as displayed in this report’s bibliography, and discussed in the 
previous chapter).  Various state tax expenditure reports, noted as being particularly comprehensive 
(e.g. Washington), were then examined to determine the extent of the possible definitions for tax 
expenditures that promoted economic development or agricultural development ends.  These 
definitions were then constructed and sub-categorized, as appropriate. 
Economic Development Tax Expenditures 
Definition:  Any tax credits, deductions, exemptions, and otherwise preferential tax 
treatment instituted to directly catalyze or support business development and/or 
job creation within the state. 
Categories:  Research and Development; Business Property or Capital; Job Creation/ 
Retention; Job Training; Geographically Targeted; General “Business Friendly” 
Investments; and Industry Specific Incentives. 
 
Agricultural Development Tax Expenditures 
Definition:  Any tax credits, deductions, exemptions, and otherwise preferential tax 
treatment instituted to directly catalyze or support agricultural development within 
the state. 
Categories:  Categories for these tax expenditures included:  Livestock and Crop 
Inputs; Machinery and Capital; Fuel; Housing and Property; Production; Services; 
and Industry Specific Incentives. 
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Additionally, within each of these tax expenditure categories, manufacturing and biofuel foci were 
noted, respectively. 
This report was not intended to be a full fifty-state survey, but rather, a broad step in moving towards 
such a comprehensive assessment of state tax expenditure costs.  As such, states that had been 
previously highlighted as having particularly strong reports were more often chosen for closer 
examination than others.  There was, however, also an attempt to achieve geographic and economic 
diversity in the states chosen for closer examination. 
Ultimately, 23 states were selected for analysis.  These states are shown in the table below.   
Figure 2:  States Examined in Tax Expenditure Assessment 
States Examined in Tax Expenditure Assessment 
Arizona Georgia Louisiana New Jersey Pennsylvania 
California Illinois Massachusetts New Mexico Texas 
Colorado Iowa Michigan New York Washington 
Connecticut Kansas Minnesota North Carolina  
Florida Kentucky Montana Ohio  
For each of these states, tax expenditure reports and/or budget documents were identified, inventoried, 
and downloaded for as far back as 2000.  This resulted in 227 different sources and 202 primary data 
documents being identified.  Note, however, that some states, which have recently adopted Tax 
Expenditure requirements, such as New Mexico and New Jersey, had far fewer documents (and related 
years of information), than others with longer histories of such public disclosure like Florida, 
Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington.   
Each of these files were then reviewed, from most current to oldest, inputting program data and cost 
estimates in reverse chronological order (as states often report past costs, as well as project future 
35 
 
costs, in a single document).  Data input was done in this way under the assumption that the latest 
information would be the most reliable for past years, given continual adjustments necessitated by late-
filers and carry-over effects.   
This extensive data collection process, which included identifying all current and past programs that fit 
the aforementioned definitions, resulted in a mixed picture of available public tax expenditure data.  
This is depicted in the table below.   
Figure 3:  State Tax Expenditure Data by Year 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AZ
CA
CO
CT
FL
GA
IA
IL
KS
KY
LA
MA
MI
MN
MT
NC
NJ
NM
NY
OH
PA
TX
WA
State
State Tax Expenditure Data by Year 
(Blue = Collected, Solid; Blue, Shaded = Collected, but Inconsistent; White = Unavailable)
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Figure 4:  Tax Expenditure County by Type 
 
State Expenditure Type
# Tax 
Expenditures 
Inventoried
Economic Development (incl mfg) 18
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 4
Economic Development (incl mfg) 10
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 5
Economic Development (incl mfg) 32
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 17
Economic Development (incl mfg) 38
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 5
Economic Development (incl mfg) 32
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 9
Economic Development (incl mfg) 20
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 14
Economic Development (incl mfg) 18
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 6
Economic Development (incl mfg) 23
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 6
Economic Development (incl mfg) 20
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 5
Economic Development (incl mfg) 33
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 29
Economic Development (incl mfg) 26
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 9
Economic Development (incl mfg) 29
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 9
Economic Development (incl mfg) 34
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 12
Economic Development (incl mfg) 23
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 19
Economic Development (incl mfg) 18
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 8
Economic Development (incl mfg) 32
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 38
Economic Development (incl mfg) 17
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 1
Economic Development (incl mfg) 14
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 6
Economic Development (incl mfg) 35
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 7
Economic Development (incl mfg) 20
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 4
Economic Development (incl mfg) 16
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 16
Economic Development (incl mfg) 18
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 12
Economic Development (incl mfg) 55
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 88
Economic Development (incl mfg) 581
Agricultural Development (incl biofuels) 329
OH
PA
TX
WA
 
MI
MT
NC
NJ
NM
NY
MN
IA
IL
KS
KY
LA
MA
AZ
CA
CO
CT
FL
GA
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As depicted on the previous page, some states, such as Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington provided long-running assessments of their tax expenditure programs.  Others such as New 
Mexico and New Jersey, while having comprehensive recent reports, are only more recently involved 
with publically disclosing (or even calculating) these detailed tax expenditure costs.  Connecticut and 
North Carolina, while having calculated and tracked individual tax expenditure (both, it should be noted, 
doing so fairly comprehensively), only released estimates for particular years. 
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Figure 5:  Economic Development Tax Expenditure State Totals 
 
Depending upon the analysis and purpose, these states and their related data are broken up into various 
state-groupings later within this report.  Again, all results should be taken with the aforementioned 
declaimers and cautions in mind.  With few exceptions, most of these state tax expenditure reports, 
AZ $1,554.0
CA $2,156.5
CO $1,402.4
CT $262.85*
FL $876.4
GA $357.5
IA $215.1
IL $380.6
$3,578.7
$729.9**
KY $338.6
LA $460.6
MA $682.0
MI $2,137.0
MN $279.7
MT $62.0
NC $465.9
NJ $315.0***
NM $94.6
NY $1,864.3
OH $2,045.9
PA $1,186.3
$12,595.6
$2,196.4^
WA $593.9
TOTAL^^ $20,657.5
* - Avg btwn 2009 & 2011;
** - W/o one outlier exp
*** - Est based on levels of 2011 and 
2012;
 ^- Without one outlier exp
^  ^- Total incl TX minus outlier
KS
TX
Economic Development (incl 
Mfg) 
Tax Expenditure Totals (2010)
(in millions)
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even some of the most “comprehensive,” have left out costs for key tax expenditures.  However, 
information gathered herein can serve as the foundation for future understanding of state tax 
expenditure issues and measures. 
State Tax Expenditures:  Data 
As detailed in the on the next page, 910 different tax expenditures were identified across all 23 states 
over an 11 year period (2000-2010).  This included 581 economic development tax expenditures, 
including those related to manufacturing, and 329 agricultural development tax expenditures, including 
those related to biofuels.   
Washington State, by far, had the most inventoried number of tax expenditures at 143:  having both the 
highest number of itemized economic development tax expenditures (55) and agricultural development 
tax expenditures (88).  North Carolina (70), Kentucky (62), and Colorado (49) also had high numbers of 
identified and inventoried tax expenditures within these categories.   
Some states presented far greater numbers of economic development tax expenditures than 
agricultural tax expenditures.  This was the case in Connecticut (38 over 5) and New Jersey (17 over 1).  
While this could partially be attributed to the less agrarian nature of certain states, and therefore, 
presumably, less of a policy focus on promoting such development, it could also simply indicate that not 
all agricultural-supporting tax expenditures have been accounted for in these reports. 
New Jersey and New Mexico, two states new to regularly publishing and reporting on tax expenditures, 
present among the least detailed reports, at least in terms of economic and agricultural development.  
Arizona, California, Iowa, Kansas, and Ohio all also present fewer than 25 tax expenditures in these 
categories. 
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Not all of these inventoried tax expenditures were active for all years, nor were they all given cost 
estimates for all the years they were active. 
State Tax Expenditures:  Overall Costs 
Economic Development Tax Expenditures 
In 2010, approximately $20.7 billion was spent by the surveyed 23 states in economic development 
(including manufacturing) tax expenditures.  This is broken out on a state-by-state basis below.  
Generally, the larger states, such as California, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Texas spent the greatest 
amount on tax expenditures for economic development purposes.  However, others, like Arizona, 
Colorado, and Kansas, all smaller states, reported having larger than expected tax expenditures than one 
might assume for states of their size; while Illinois, New Jersey, and Florida, by comparison to their size, 
reported having smaller than expected expenditures.  This comes out most clearly on the next table. 
When examining state economic development tax expenditures for 2010 by the amount of state 
revenue collected, certain states’ proclivity for using tax expenditures as an economic policy tool 
become more apparent.  Colorado, for instance, “gives up” five cents per every dollar of state revenue 
collected, just for economic development purposes.  Arizona, Kansas (even without the outlying 
manufacturing input tax expenditure), and Michigan all, also give up between three and five cents to 
economic development tax expenditures for every dollar of revenue collected. 
On the other hand, California, with $2.1 billion in reported state economic development tax 
expenditures in 2010, falls to the lower half of the pack, given its enormous state tax base, as does New 
York. 
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Figure 6:  Tax Expenditures by State Revenue Dollar 
 
On average, for the 23 states surveyed for 2010, approximately 1.4 cents is spent on economic 
development tax expenditures for every dollar of revenue collected; that is, from every dollar that 
comes to the state from personal income tax, corporate income tax, sales tax, intergovernmental 
revenue, license taxes, etc, 1.4 cents is given up to support economic development ends.  Where these 
expenditures are spent within economic development also produces interesting results.   
State
Tax
Expenditures
(in millions)
State Tax 
Revenues 
(in millions)
Expenditures 
per Revenue 
Dollar
CO $1,402.4 $27,990.5 0.050
AZ $1,554.0 $32,830.0 0.047
KS $729.9 $16,538.2 0.044
MI $2,137.0 $66,524.4 0.032
OH $2,045.9 $89,623.1 0.023
TX $2,196.4 $120,389.8 0.018
LA $460.6 $32,176.9 0.014
PA $1,186.3 $83,623.1 0.014
MA $682.0 $50,367.7 0.014
WA $593.9 $44,306.8 0.013
KY $338.6 $27,771.8 0.012
IA $215.1 $21,162.5 0.010
CT $262.9 $26,791.4 0.010
FL $876.4 $91,758.7 0.010
NY $1,864.3 $195,460.0 0.010
MT $62.0 $7,476.9 0.008
NC $465.9 $57,467.4 0.008
GA $357.5 $44,878.0 0.008
CA $2,156.5 $279,360.9 0.008
MN $279.7 $39,887.0 0.007
NM $94.6 $17,485.4 0.005
IL $380.6 $71,292.6 0.005
NJ $315.0 $66,531.20 0.005
TOTAL $20,657.4 $1,511,694.3 0.014
States by Economic Development Tax Expenditures 
per Revenue Dollar Collected (2010)
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In 2010, again, holding all previous analysis approximations and assumptions constant (see bottom of 
first table), it becomes clear that the majority (nearly 54 percent or $11.1 billion) of all economic 
development tax expenditures goes specifically to manufacturing-based purposes.  This includes, for 
instance:  $77.1 million for electricity used in manufacturing in Florida; $828 million for industrial 
processing in Michigan; $217 million for capital equipment in Minnesota; $614 million in manufacturing 
machinery and equipment in Texas; and $1.4 million for the manufacturing of semiconductor materials 
in tech-heavy Washington.   
While perhaps initially unexpected, given that manufacturers now employ less than ten percent of the 
US workforce, when thinking about the payoffs policymakers expect when instituting economic 
development incentives, it perhaps becomes more clear:   one of the main rationales behind instituting 
economic development tax incentives is to create (or retain) jobs.  Manufacturing plants are mobile and 
large – both in the amount of capital investment they bring, as well as the number of people they 
employ.  Attracting and retaining these mega-employers would often fit the goals of policy-makers 
looking for quick economic infusions.   
Figure 7:  Economic Development Tax Expenditures, 2010 
 
In 2010, when economic development tax expenditures are taken in total (including manufacturing) 
then categorized by target area, it is shown that 39 percent of economic development tax expenditures 
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go toward supporting investments in “Business Property or Capital” (as shown above).  Another 19 
percent go towards “Inputs & Fuel,” while 11 percent goes each to “Enterprise Zones/ Geographically 
Targeted” incentives and “Research and Development.” 
Figure 8:  Economic Development Tax Expenditures by Type, 2010 
 
However, ten percent, or just over $2 billion across the sampled 23 states goes to support specific 
industries.  Some notable highlights from these specific industry supports include: 
 $14 million in Arizona for solar energy devices; 
 $55 million in California for motion picture credits; 
 $19.5 million in Connecticut for electronic data processing; 
 $62 million in Florida for the sale or use of satellites or other space vehicles; 
 $25 million in Kentucky for various horse breeding incentives; 
 $164 million in Louisiana for motion picture incentives; 
 $5 million in Massachusetts for a life sciences incentive program; 
 $4.2 million in Michigan for NASCAR safety and speedway credits; 
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 $116 million in New York for Empire State Film Production Credits; 
 $23.5 million in Ohio for Qualified Call Center exemptions; and  
 $95.8 million in Washington for the manufacturing of commercial aircraft. 
States with concentrated industries – solar in Arizona, film in California, automobiles in Michigan, 
aircraft manufacturing in Washington – often have multiple tax expenditures designed, specifically, to 
benefit those industries. 
Agricultural Development Tax Expenditures 
In 2010, approximately $4.1 billion was spent between the 23 states on agricultural tax expenditures.  
States like Texas ($433 million), Washington ($363 million), North Carolina ($346.7 million), and 
Kentucky ($335 million), led the group, reporting the most generous agricultural tax expenditures.  Only 
approximately $165 million of that $4.1 billion was spent on biofuel incentives (or around four percent).  
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Figure 9:  Agricultural Development State Tax Expenditure Totals 
 
Of those expenditures in 2010, approximately 47 percent, or $1.92 billion, went to “Livestock and Crop 
Inputs.”  This includes, for instance, an estimated $271 million in sales tax breaks for farmers in Texas on 
“Agricultural feed, seed chemicals, and supplies.”  Kansas, again, for “Sales of animals, fowl, aquatic 
plants, and animals used in agriculture or aquaculture…”, sales tax breaks are given at a cost to the state 
of nearly $210.4 million.  
AZ $25.4
CA $16.0
CO $254.2
CT $12.7
FL $178.0
GA $257.5
IA $15.2
IL $331.5
KS $289.5
KY $335.0
LA $3.3
MA $27.2
MI $532.1
MN $122.9
MT $0.0
NC $346.7
NJ $0.0
NM $3.0
NY $127.7
OH $264.7
PA $164.0
TX $433.3
WA $363.2
TOTAL $4,102.9
Agricultural Development 
(incl Biofuels) 
Tax Expenditure Totals (2010)
(in millions)
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Another 36 percent of agricultural development tax expenditures, or about $1.5 billion, went to 
incentives or breaks that directly impacted farmers’ housing, property, capital investments, or their 
bottom-line.  This included fairer treatment of farmland for property taxes ($71 million in breaks in 
Washington; $66.5 million in Minnesota), tax credits or waivers on purchases of farm machinery ($68.9 
million on “agricultural machinery and equipment” in Texas, $53 million for a “farm machinery and 
equipment exemption” in Illinois), and even credits for loans ($700k in Minnesota) and income 
averaging ($200k in Kentucky), the latter a common expenditure across states, given the volatile nature 
of farm income year to year. 
While agricultural tax expenditures go to, presumably, make farming more competitive in one state over 
another, the question, like with economic development tax expenditures, must be asked:  to what ends?   
Figure 10:  Agricultural Development Tax Expenditures by Type, 2010 
 
Policy-makers, particularly at the federal level, must examine where competition between the states 
does result in better long-term outcomes, and where it could result in sub-optimal national scenarios.  
For instance, if state policymakers believe that these agricultural development tax incentives do have an 
impact on farm growth and location, what does that mean?  Does that mean that some states are 
fostering more of an agricultural base than would be optimal, nationally, given the quality of the 
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weather, soil, and infrastructure?  If the concern is international competitiveness, should those 
incentives then be handled at the national level?  And if so, would they violate WTO trade agreements? 
The question of tax incentives not only focus on their impact and their efficacy in regards to the overall 
tax burden, but stretch into the role of competition between states, and whether it is in the nation’s 
interest for that competition to be monitored to serve states’ long-term interests. 
State Tax Expenditures:  Cost Changes Over Time 
To measure potential economic development and agricultural development tax expenditure changes 
over time, for this study, we have selected eleven states for which the data are most complete.  These 
eleven states, and the years (and estimates) used in this subsequent descriptive analysis, are shown in 
the chart below. 
Figure 11:  States Examined in Tax Expenditure "Over Time" Assessment 
States Examined in Tax Expenditure over Time Assessment 
California 2000 (est), 2001-2009, 2010 (est) Minnesota 2000-2003 (est), 2004-2010 
Colorado 2000-2001 (est), 2002-2010 New York 2000-2001 (est), 2002-2010 
Florida 2000-2010 Ohio 2000-2010 
Iowa 2000-2002 (est), 2003-2010 Pennsylvania 2000-2010 
Illinois 2000-2010 Washington 2000-2010 
Massachusetts 2000-2010 * Estimates made carrying through prev years’ trends 
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Figure 12:  Economic Development Tax Expenditures over Time 
 
These eleven states spent $10.98 billion in economic development tax expenditures in 2010, about on 
par with the $10.8 billion in economic development tax expenditures they offered eleven years prior 
in 2000.  What has changed, however, as shown in the graph above, is the distribution of the economic 
development tax expenditures.  In 2000, two thirds of economic development tax expenditures were 
spent directly on manufacturing related credits, deductions, preferential tax treatment; in 2010, that has 
slipped by 23 percentage points, to make up only 43 percent of all economic development expenditures.  
Thus, while total state economic development tax expenditure have remained largely constant for 
since 2000, state tax expenditure spending has shifted dramatically away from manufacturing 
purposes. 
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Figure 13:  Economic Development Tax Expenditures over Time, by Type 
 
Within “General Economic Development” tax expenditure spending, two categories have seen 
particularly notable growth:  “Research and Development” tax expenditures spending, since 2000, was 
up by over 133 percent for the eleven state samples, while “Enterprise Zone” expenditure spending 
along with other geographically targeted expenditures, was up an astounding 353 percent.  Within this 
eleven state sample, there were 27 tax expenditure items inventoried; 15 of these 27 had either posted 
gains over the eleven years or did not exist at the beginning of the period.  The largest gains were seen 
in California, where its “Research and Development Expenses Credit” grew from a cost of $445 million in 
2001 to $1.2 billion in 2010.  In Iowa, the “Research Activities Credit” grew from $28.1 million in 2002 to 
$45.7 million in 2009.   
“Enterprise Zones/ Geographically Targeted” tax expenditures similarly saw broad-based cost increases 
across the 76 expenditures inventoried (with 42 either showing decade gains or previously not existing), 
though were largely driven by particular states’ large investments.  Again, in California, their “Enterprise 
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Zones” and “Special tax treatments for economically depressed areas” tax expenditures saw their costs 
nearly tripled from $200 million in 2001 to $550 million in 2010.  In Florida, its credits for “credit for job 
creation in enterprise zones” increased in cost from $1.2 million in 2000 to $5.3 million in 2010.  In 
Illinois, its “Enterprise & FTZ high economic impact business exemption” saw a cost increase of nearly 
$10 million, to $44.9 million, while New York invested heavily into its brownfield programs (totaling over 
$623 million in 2010, up from nominal-costing, similar tax credits in 2000).   
Over the eleven year period for the eleven states only two of the major general economic development 
categories saw declines in spending:  Industry Specific expenditures (down 11 percent) and Job 
Creation/ Retention expenditures (down 18 percent).  However, with the latter, this belies significantly 
2007 and 2008, recessionary-reaction expenditures that, temporarily, doubled such programs (from 
$137 million in 2006 to $305.4 million in 2007 and $211.3 million in 2008). 
Agricultural Development 
Unlike with economic development tax expenditures, agricultural development tax expenditures have 
two notable differences:  1. From 2000 to 2010, the eleven states have spent nearly fifty percent more 
on such tax expenditures, increasing from $1.26 billion in 2000 to $1.86 billion in 2010; and 2. The 
subcategory of biofuels, even at its peak (2008), only accounted for 9.4 percent of agricultural 
development expenditures.   
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Figure 14:  Agricultural Development Tax Expenditures over Time 
 
Agricultural tax expenditure growth crossed all categories, ranging from 27 percent growth over the 
eleven years for “Housing, Property, Capital and Income” to 62 percent growth for “Industry Specific” 
support.  
Figure 15:  Agricultural Development Tax Expenditures over Time, by Type 
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Chapter IV:  Tax Expenditure Impact on Economic & Agricultural 
Development 
Models 
Form 
To determine the impact economic and agricultural development tax expenditures have had on 
economic and agricultural development, a Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) was employed for our 
eleven state, eleven year sample.   
While this technique uses OLS, it takes steps to further alleviate the inherent correlation between our 
models’ dependent variables (number of firms with more than 100 employees, net farm income, and 
crop and livestock revenue) and potential independent variables.   3SLS accomplishes this by including 
each other’s dependent variables as instrumental variables in the other’s regression. 
Limitations 
While 3SLS, computed using STATA Version12.1, did alleviate some of the correlation between 
dependent variables, significant endogenous and exogenous limitations continued to impact the 
ultimate model produced.   
Variables most directly accounting for population, for instance, had to be dropped to avoid simultaneity 
bias with the “Firms100” variable.  This does make theoretical sense, as larger population states would 
also likely have larger firms, hand-in-hand.  Determining causality in those circumstances are, however, 
tough.  The R-squared of 0.979 between these variables forced the dropping of “POP” or “PopSh” from 
our models (though replaced, in some runs, with EmplPop, or the percentage of the population 
currently in the workforce). 
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Other variables also had high correlations between one another, creating multicollinearity issues.  Every 
variable was tested to determine the correlation it had, empirically, to every other variable.  Some 
examples of problematic correlations included: 
 GOPLegLU and GOPLegGov:  R-Squared of 0.71 
 TIncFDed and TCorpInc:  R-Squared of 0.466 
 Firms100 and Empl:  R-Squared of 0.9916 
Accounting for state fixed effects, while bringing significant benefits in picking up individual state 
characteristics that would otherwise go unaccounted for, also brought to our models its own issues.  
Iowa, for example, was perfectly correlated with TIncFDed.  Rght2Wrk, another variable of interest, also 
had to be dropped because of its near perfect correlation with two states.  Our final models also, given 
these fixed effects, had tremendously high R-squares. 
These issues, hopefully, in the future, will not continue, as more states over a greater period of time, will 
be accounted for.  These are all issues symptomatic of a small sample size, the greatest limitations of 
our modeling. 
Dependent Variable 
Within our first, broader model, we set out to estimate the impact the variables had over an eleven year 
period on “economic development outcomes.”  To quantify economic development, a number of 
potential variables were at our disposal, including employment, payrolls, and industry output or 
revenues.  For the purposes of this paper, however, the question had to be asked as to which firms most 
often know and take advantage of available economic development tax incentives.  The answer to that 
question, as experienced in the field, almost always, is the larger corporations and the firms able to 
afford site selectors.   
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Accordingly, in selecting an appropriate measure of “economic development” related to tax 
expenditures, the proxy chosen was “the year-over-year change in the number of firms with greater 
than 100 employees” in a given state.  This would, hypothetically, allow the model to test characteristics 
of an area at which a hypothetical firm would weigh, if and when it chose to establish itself within a 
state.   
Model 1:  Y = Year-over-Year Change in the # Firms with > 100 employees 
Data used for this dependent variable originated with County Business Patterns (CBP).  It should also be 
noted that “establishments,” by CBP’s accounting, does not equate to a firm’s headquarters or main 
location; a firm can have “multiple units” or locations, like auto manufacturing plants located across 
many states in the American Southeast40.   
Note, that this dependent variable, and thus this model, makes the assumption that growth is not 
occurring endogenously (firms with <100 employees one year are not simply growing to have an >100 
employee count that severely biases the model).  
Over the eleven year period, the eleven states used within our analysis accounted for between 45.6 
percent (2010) and 46.5 percent (2000) of all firms with over 100 employees in the United States. 
                                                          
40
 http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/methodology.htm  
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Figure 16:  Firms with Over 100 Employees 
 
From 2000 to 2010, the number of firms with over 100 employees in the United States decreased by six 
percent to 165,063 (note though, that does not represent the number of employees employed by these 
firms).  The eleven state sample, during this period, performed significantly better than the US average, 
posting a decrease of only 1.8 percent.  In fact, eight of the 11 states performed better than the United 
States (with Washington leading the pack with a 6.3 percent gain), while five performed worse (dragged 
down by Ohio, which lost 8 percent of firms in this size category). 
States 2000 2010
Pct Change
(00-10)
Pct Change  
US Comp
CA 19,687 17,675 -10.2% -4.2%
CO 2,853 2,752 -3.5% 2.5%
FL 9,389 9,149 -2.6% 3.5%
IA 1,890 1,782 -5.7% 0.3%
IL 8,886 7,689 -13.5% -7.4%
MA 4,960 4,555 -8.2% -2.1%
MN 3,865 3,686 -4.6% 1.4%
NY 10,755 10,260 -4.6% 1.4%
OH 8,034 6,903 -14.1% -8.0%
PA 8,141 7,605 -6.6% -0.5%
WA 3,277 3,286 0.3% 6.3%
TOTAL 81,737 75,342 -7.8% -1.8%
PCT of US 46.5% 45.6%
US 175,692 165,063 -6.0% 0%
# firms with over 100 employees
Source:  County Business Patterns
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Figure 17:  Firms with Over 100 Employees, Pct Change 
 
With the second model, wherein we estimate the impact the variables had over an eleven year period of 
“agricultural development outcomes,” a simple profitability proxy was ultimately used.  While 
agricultural revenues, employment, and acreage all could arguably be used, each had flaws that could 
undermine the causal relationship:  agricultural revenues fluctuate, largely, based upon world market 
prices and government subsidy support levels, not whether farmers were given tax incentives; 
employment in the industry, regardless of tax consequences, continues to decline, replaced by ever-
more efficient capital; and acreage does not accurately represent “development,” but could even 
represent the opposite, with farmers having to plant and harvest land for extra revenue that might 
otherwise have been left fallow.   
“Net farm profit” was chosen as the dependent variable in the second model, not because it was 
perfect, but rather, because it best represented a reliable proxy likely impacted by tax expenditures, for 
which data was available during the highlighted period. 
Model 2:  Y = Net Farm Profit 
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Net farm profit data was collected from the USDA’s Economic Research Service. 
Figure 18:  Net Farm Income 
 
Net farm profit across the United States from 2000 to 2010 increased by nearly 60 percent to $80.4 
billion.  The eleven state sample made up 37.3 percent of the US’ Net Farm Income in 2000 and 42.3 
percent in 2010.  Minnesota (230 percent), New York (112 percent), Iowa (105 percent), and Illinois (100 
percent) all posted triple-digit percent gains over the eleven year timeframe.  Massachusetts (11 
percent), Pennsylvania (25 percent), Colorado (43 percent), and Ohio (55 percent) all lagged the nation 
in net farm income gains. 
For our final models, we also added a third independent variable, “Crop and Livestock Revenue”, to 
account for independent variation in revenue, and to account for the inherent correlation between farm 
income and farm revenues. 
Model 3:  Y = Crop and Livestock Revenue 
States 2000 2010
Pct Change
(00-10)
Pct Change  
US Comp
CA $5,566,899 $10,949,761 96.7% 38.1%
CO $816,231 $1,170,242 43.4% -15.3%
FL $2,718,975 $2,055,676 -24.4% -83.0%
IA $2,434,393 $4,983,076 104.7% 46.1%
IL $1,691,197 $3,386,952 100.3% 41.6%
MA $95,863 $106,284 10.9% -47.8%
MN $1,407,384 $4,638,647 229.6% 171.0%
NY $560,356 $1,187,333 111.9% 53.3%
OH $1,449,172 $2,246,962 55.1% -3.6%
PA $1,120,031 $1,397,147 24.7% -33.9%
WA $1,021,478 $1,903,302 86.3% 27.7%
TOTAL $18,881,978 $34,025,380 80.2% 21.6%
PCT of US 37.3% 42.3%
US $50,684,874 $80,404,063 58.6%
Net Farm Income (in $000s)
Source:  ERS/ USDA
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Crop and Livestock Revenue data was collected from the USDA’s Economic Research Service, and was 
used, in a third model, to better explain the variation within Net Farm Profits. 
Independent Variables of Interest 
The first model tested for the impact of economic development tax expenditures, as a percentage of 
each state’s budget, on the number of firms that employed over 100 individuals. 
Model 1:  HO:  BEcon Dev Exp = 0 
Model 1:  H1:  BEcon Dev Exp ≠ 0 
The second, agricultural model tested for the impact of agricultural development tax expenditures (via 
revenues), as a percentage of each state’s budget, on the aggregate net farm profit of each state. 
Model 2:  HO:  BAg Dev Exp = 0 
Model 2:  H1:  BAg Dev Exp ≠ 0 
The third, agriculture-related model directly tested for the impact of agricultural development tax 
expenditures, as a percentage of each state’s budget, on the aggregate farm revenues of each state. 
Model 3:  HO:  BAg Dev Exp = 0 
Model 3:  H1:  BAg Dev Exp ≠ 0 
Both economic development and agricultural expenditures were weighted against the state budgets to 
account for the differences in average tax burden within each state.  For instance, in a higher tax and 
higher revenue state, such as New York, one could expect to also see higher tax expenditures or tax 
breaks (and per our earlier chart, while it does have the fourth highest level of tax expenditures for our 
23 state sample, when weighted against its actual tax collection, it ranks 15th).  Therefore, weighting 
59 
 
identified economic development tax expenditures against budgetary levels provides a more accurate 
depiction of the depth of the tax breaks, per level of taxation, the more relevant indicator against our 
dependent variable. 
Other Independent Variables 
The variables used in this report’s regression analyses are shown in this report’s Appendix.  Not all were 
used in each model; they also do not represent all variables examined for this analysis.  These factors, 
certainly, are not exhaustive to determining economic development outcomes, but were hypothesized 
to be major factors in determining site locations and/or net farm income.   
Regression Results 
Within this section, results of our top three models are presented in level-level and log-log form, 
respectively, then results – relying most heavily on the first, our primary, model – discussed. 
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3 Step Least Squares Equations
All State and Year dummies are based on New York and year 2000, respectively
Variable Included Level/Log Coefficient P-Value Variable Inclusion Level/Log Coefficient P-Value
Firms100 x Level FrmInc x Level
TCorpInc x Level 4,535.095 0.153 CropLvskRev x Level 0.270 0.000
Tsales x Level -51,669.680 0.000 TCorpInc2 x Level -1,667,386.000 0.481
TInc100k x Level -11,651.740 0.006 GOPLegGov x 173,799.300 0.318
Rt2Wrk WFWage x Level -113.222 0.875
EmplPop x Level 4.510 0.037 Interstate_sqmi x Level 413,520.400 0.725
WFWage x Level 3.123 0.086 Port x Level -43,791.460 0.368
GOPGov x  487.805 0.000 PIndElec x Level 11,888.300 0.489
GOPLegLU x  -145.496 0.192 Firms100 x Level 40.873 0.149
Interstate_sqmi x Level -35,646.800 0.088 _cons x -496,329.500 0.334
EconDev_PBudgetDollar x Level -9,027.243 0.064 CropLvskRev x Level
PIndElec x Level 10.869 0.363
FrmInc x Level -0.002 0.023 Pop x Level -520.2328 0.208
CA x 10,073.720 0.000 FarmSize x Level 32,708.100 0.000
CO x -11,952.850 0.000 GOPGov x 3,191,179.000 0.000
FL x -37.795 0.677 GOPLegLU x -574,153.200 0.214
IA x -9,617.687 0.000 AvgTemp x Level -307,314.000 0.042
IL x -178.215 0.754 AvgPrecip x Level 32,908.070 0.173
MA x 2,989.974 0.533 AgDev_PBudgetDollar x Level 599,000,000.000 0.000
MN x -8,755.036 0.000 CA x 37,600,000.000 0.000
OH x 313.609 0.783 CO x -33,200,000.000 0.000
PA x -978.773 0.119 FL x 7,595,261.000 0.049
WA x -8,970.618 0.000 IA x 3,083,603.000 0.639
Y2001 x 5.739 0.959 IL x -1,082,876.000 0.729
Y2002 x -405.784 0.001 MA x -5,237,521.000 0.339
Y2003 x -133.920 0.392 MN x -7,214,705.000 0.237
Y2004 x -90.567 0.699 OH x -729,877.000 0.834
Y2005 x -183.557 0.456 PA x 6,420.867 0.998
Y2006 x -161.439 0.581 WA x -13,100,000.000 0.021
Y2007 x -30.494 0.935 Y2001 x 682,386.400 0.164
Y2008 x 107.868 0.804 Y2002 x 870,190.900 0.077
Y2009 x -327.264 0.425 Y2003 x 1,207,832.000 0.023
Y2010 x -511.562 0.286 Y2004 x 1,912,501.000 0.000
_cons x 3.710 0.000 Y2005 x 1,934,681.000 0.000
Y2006 x 2,614,661.000 0.000
Y2007 x 6,566,890.000 0.000
Y2008 x 7,226,633.000 0.000
Y2009 x 6,435,705.000 0.000
Y2010 x 7,449,758.000 0.000
_cons x 14,000,000.000 0.206
R-sq = 0.996 Chi2 = 30,044
Equation 1 - Level-Level Form
Chi2 = 64,026R-sq = 0.997 R-sq = 0.949 Chi2 = 2,071
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3 Step Least Squares Equations
All State and Year dummies are based on New York and year 2000, respectively
Variable Included Level/Log Coefficient P-Value Variable Inclusion Level/Log Coefficient P-Value
Firms100 x Log FrmInc x Log
TCorpInc x Log 0.004 0.590 CropLvskRev x Log 1.137 0.000
Tsales x Log -0.161 0.004 TCorpInc2 x Log -0.007 0.703
TInc100k x Log -0.024 0.460 GOPLegGov x 0.124 0.096
Rt2Wrk WFWage x Log -0.191 0.498
EmplPop x Log 0.350 0.000 Interstate_sqmi x Log 0.188 0.016
WFWage x Log 0.454 0.023 Port x Log 0.006 0.480
GOPGov x  0.026 0.001 PIndElec x Log 0.163 0.262
GOPLegLU x  0.009 0.446 Firms100 x Log -0.085 0.363
Interstate_sqmi x Log -0.777 0.022 _cons x -1.676 0.357
EconDev_PBudgetDollar x Log -0.014 0.259 CropLvskRev x Log
PIndElec x Log -0.014 0.574
FrmInc x Log -0.097 0.000 Pop x Log -0.675811 0.004
CA x 0.582 0.000 FarmSize x Log 0.999 0.000
CO x -2.345 0.000 GOPGov x 0.013 0.495
FL x -0.697 0.741 GOPLegLU x 0.010 0.720
IA x -2.135 0.000 AvgTemp x Log -0.674 0.103
IL x 0.029 0.662 AvgPrecip x Log 0.072 0.129
MA x -0.274 0.369 AgDev_PBudgetDollar x Log 0.017 0.141
MN x -1.732 0.000 CA x 2.348 0.000
OH x 0.075 0.539 CO x -2.076 0.000
PA x -0.037 0.627 FL x 0.765 0.000
WA x -1.842 0.000 IA x -0.168 0.690
Y2001 x 0.004 0.707 IL x 0.219 0.102
Y2002 x -0.079 0.000 MA x -1.902 0.000
Y2003 x -0.029 0.126 MN x -0.411 0.188
Y2004 x -0.020 0.480 OH x 0.202 0.129
Y2005 x -0.028 0.391 PA x 0.459 0.001
Y2006 x -0.024 0.535 WA x -0.920 0.000
Y2007 x -0.019 0.689 Y2001 x 0.047 0.105
Y2008 x 0.007 0.898 Y2002 x 0.049 0.091
Y2009 x -0.066 0.214 Y2003 x 0.091 0.003
Y2010 x -0.073 0.234 Y2004 x 0.174 0.000
_cons x 3.283 0.064 Y2005 x 0.156 0.000
Y2006 x 0.212 0.000
Y2007 x 0.504 0.000
Y2008 x 0.582 0.000
Y2009 x 0.480 0.000
Y2010 x 0.563 0.000
_cons x 18.639 0.000
R-sq = 0.996 Chi2 = 30,044
Equation 1 - Log-Log Form
R-sq = 0.997 Chi2 = 64,026 R-sq = 0.949 Chi2 = 2,071
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3 Step Least Squares Equations
All State and Year dummies are based on New York and year 2000, respectively
Variable Included Level/Log Coefficient P-Value Variable Inclusion Level/Log Coefficient P-Value
Firms100 x Level FrmInc x Level
TCorpInc x Level -754.480 0.825 CropLvskRev x Level 0.257 0.000
Tsales TCorpInc2 x Level 232,057.800 0.911
TInc100k GOPLegGov
Rt2Wrk WFWage
EmplPop Interstate_sqmi
WFWage Port
GOPGov PIndElec
GOPLegLU Firms100 x Level 35.372 0.021
Interstate_sqmi _cons x -316,192.900 0.055
EconDev_PBudgetDollar x Level 5,045.619 0.231 CropLvskRev x Level
PIndElec
FrmInc x Level 0.000 0.113 Pop Level 36341.93 0.000
CA x 10,089.770 0.000 FarmSize x
CO x -7,923.203 0.000 GOPGov
FL x -796.795 0.000 GOPLegLU
IA x -8,374.855 0.000 AvgTemp x Level -521,915.500 0.006
IL x -2,105.127 0.000 AvgPrecip x Level 53,433.080 0.066
MA x -6,076.220 0.000 AgDev_PBudgetDollar x Level 521,000,000.000 0.008
MN x -6,565.998 0.000 CA x 31,800,000.000 0.000
OH x -3,255.363 0.000 CO x -27,400,000.000 0.001
PA x -2,673.782 0.000 FL x 14,000,000.000 0.004
WA x -7,358.226 0.000 IA x 9,182,131.000 0.000
Y2001 x 93.197 0.448 IL x 2,171,924.000 0.391
Y2002 x -373.981 0.003 MA x 1,938,841.000 0.171
Y2003 x -222.678 0.077 MN x -318,162.000 0.870
Y2004 x 0.192 0.999 OH x 4,034,248.000 0.002
Y2005 x 79.807 0.617 PA x 4,166,145.000 0.000
Y2006 x 302.212 0.029 WA x -7,864,487.000 0.021
Y2007 x 314.052 0.065 Y2001 x 862,209.300 0.168
Y2008 x 463.518 0.021 Y2002 x 912,762.500 0.141
Y2009 x -251.064 0.106 Y2003 x 499,098.600 0.414
Y2010 x -338.189 0.088 Y2004 x 1,500,840.000 0.016
_cons x 10,808.280 0.000 Y2005 x 1,723,264.000 0.006
Y2006 x 2,632,818.000 0.000
Y2007 x 5,075,491.000 0.000
Y2008 x 5,451,532.000 0.000
Y2009 x 4,754,796.000 0.000
Y2010 x 5,907,256.000 0.000
_cons x 15,200,000.000 0.096
R-sq = 0.9683 Chi2 = 3,833.35
Equation 2 - Level-Level Form
R-sq = 0.9963 Chi2 = 33,503.84 R-sq = 0.925 Chi2 = 1,416.71
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3 Step Least Squares Equations
All State and Year dummies are based on New York and year 2000, respectively
Variable Included Level/Log Coefficient P-Value Variable Inclusion Level/Log Coefficient P-Value
Firms100 x Log FrmInc x Log
TCorpInc x Log 0.011 0.166 CropLvskRev x Log 1.029 0.000
Tsales   TCorpInc2 x Log 0.004 0.859
TInc100k   GOPLegGov
Rt2Wrk WFWage
EmplPop   Interstate_sqmi
WFWage   Port
GOPGov   PIndElec
GOPLegLU   Firms100 x Log 0.113 0.017
Interstate_sqmi   _cons x -2.877 0.000
EconDev_PBudgetDollar x Log 0.006 0.719 CropLvskRev x Log
PIndElec   
FrmInc x Log -0.035 0.194 Pop x
CA x 0.688 0.000 FarmSize x Log 1.185 0.000
CO x -1.300 0.000 GOPGov x
FL x -0.058 0.009 GOPLegLU x
IA x -1.680 0.000 AvgTemp x Log -0.761 0.069
IL x -0.211 0.000 AvgPrecip x Log 0.087 0.071
MA x -0.889 0.000 AgDev_PBudgetDollar x Log 0.017 0.147
MN x -0.995 0.000 CA x 1.864 0.000
OH x -0.326 0.000 CO x -1.390 0.000
PA x -0.284 0.000 FL x 0.847 0.000
WA x 1.111 0.000 IA x 0.975 0.000
Y2001 x 0.011 0.323 IL x 0.389 0.001
Y2002 x -0.063 0.000 MA x -0.995 0.000
Y2003 x -0.042 0.000 MN x 0.373 0.000
Y2004 x -0.021 0.263 OH x 0.572 0.000
Y2005 x -0.005 0.765 PA x 0.837 0.000
Y2006 x 0.026 0.058 WA x -0.306 0.018
Y2007 x 0.026 0.083 Y2001 x 0.043 0.137
Y2008 x 0.047 0.015 Y2002 x 0.037 0.197
Y2009 x -0.037 0.006 Y2003 x 0.052 0.059
Y2010 x -0.051 0.010 Y2004 x 0.157 0.000
_cons x 9.809 0.000 Y2005 x 0.135 0.000
Y2006 x 0.187 0.000
Y2007 x 0.488 0.000
Y2008 x 0.556 0.000
Y2009 x 0.452 0.000
Y2010 x 0.527 0.000
_cons x 11.303 0.000
R-sq = 0.9959 Chi2 = 29,336
Equation 2 - Log-Log Form
R-sq = 0.998 Chi2 = 66,027 R-sq = 0.9423 Chi2 = 1,837
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3 Step Least Squares Equations
All State and Year dummies are based on New York and year 2000, respectively
Variable Included Level/Log Coefficient P-Value Variable Inclusion Level/Log Coefficient P-Value
Firms100 x Level FrmInc x Level
TCorpInc x Level 15212.69 0.194 CropLvskRev x Level 0.243 0.000
Tsales x Level -64191.6 0.034 TCorpInc2 x Level 24,013.140 0.992
TInc100k x Level -71053.68 0.000 GOPLegGov
Rt2Wrk x Level -283.6089 0.728 WFWage x Level -168.768 0.792
EmplPop  Interstate_sqmi x Level -88,591.810 0.936
WFWage x Level 20.61416 0.000 Port x Level -42,569.060 0.290
GOPGov x Level 132.9854 0.797 PIndElec x Level -1,680.317 0.921
GOPLegLU x Level 2642.692 0.000 Firms100 x Level 96.790 0.000
Interstate_sqmi x Level 19459.53 0.000 _cons x Level -350,260.500 0.426
EconDev_PBudgetDollar x Level 24774.12 0.191 CropLvskRev x Level
PIndElec x Level 29.12883 0.682
FrmInc x Level 0.002545 0.000 Pop x Level 321.508 0.000
CA FarmSize x Level -7,429.380 0.059
CO GOPGov x Level -2,321,266.000 0.034
FL GOPLegLU x Level -1,169,471.000 0.334
IA AvgTemp x Level 267,324.300 0.005
IL AvgPrecip x Level -448,614.900 0.000
MA AgDev_PBudgetDollar x Level -658,000,000.000 0.000
MN CA
OH CO
PA FL
WA IA
Y2001 x Level -365.414 -0.400 IL
Y2002 x Level -1,100.544 -1.200 MA
Y2003 x Level -1,693.615 -1.810 MN
Y2004 x Level -2,790.198 -2.820 OH
Y2005 x Level -2,799.912 -2.860 PA
Y2006 x Level -3,413.955 -3.360 WA
Y2007 x Level -5,550.760 -4.690 Y2001 x Level -387,627.400 0.851
Y2008 x Level -6,224.525 -5.140 Y2002 x Level 359,090.000 0.861
Y2009 x Level -5,576.336 -4.670 Y2003 x Level 1,799,945.000 0.389
Y2010 x Level -6,942.299 -5.530 Y2004 x Level 2,479,102.000 0.233
_cons x Level -10,364.420 -2.590 Y2005 x Level 2,093,733.000 0.213
Y2006 x Level 2,110,126.000 0.308
Y2007 x Level 2,323,908.000 0.271
Y2008 x Level 5,489,979.000 0.010
Y2009 x Level 3,305,173.000 0.119
Y2010 x Level 4,000,155.000 0.061
_cons x Level 12,600,000.000 0.002
R-sq = 0.6617 Chi2 = 258.12
Equation 3 - Level-Level Form
R-sq = 0.6609 Chi2 = 378.71 R-sq = 0.9191 Chi2 = 1,433.18
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3 Step Least Squares Equations
All State and Year dummies are based on New York and year 2000, respectively
Variable Included Level/Log Coefficient P-Value Variable Inclusion Level/Log Coefficient P-Value
Firms100 x Log FrmInc x Log
TCorpInc2 x Log 0.086 0.045 CropLvskRev x Log 1.082 0.000
Tsales x Log -0.598 0.006 TCorpInc2 x Log -0.028 0.576
TInc100k x Log 0.018 0.778 GOPLegGov
Rt2Wrk x Log -0.781 0.000 WFWage x Log 0.047 0.879
EmplPop Interstate_sqmi x Log 0.165 0.064
WFWage x Log 1.727 0.011 Port x Log 0.022 0.346
GOPGov x Log 0.042 0.451 PIndElec x Log -0.003 0.990
GOPLegLU x Log 0.198 0.001 Firms100 x Log -0.092 0.450
Interstate_sqmi x Log 0.763 0.000 _cons x -2.020 0.251
EconDev_PBudgetDollar x Log 0.033 0.671 CropLvskRev x Log
PIndElec x Log 0.440 0.000
FrmInc x Log 0.635 0.000 Pop x Log 0.675 0.000
CA FarmSize x Log 1.914 0.000
CO GOPGov x Log 0.085 0.604
FL GOPLegLU x Log 1.107 0.000
IA AvgTemp x Log 1.499 0.100
IL AvgPrecip x Log 1.076 0.000
MA AgDev_PBudgetDollar x Log -0.246 0.000
MN CA
OH CO
PA FL
WA IA
Y2001 x -0.053 0.501 IL
Y2002 x 0.014 0.867 MA
Y2003 x -0.251 0.004 MN
Y2004 x -0.489 0.000 OH
Y2005 x -0.518 0.000 PA
Y2006 x -0.558 0.000 WA
Y2007 x -0.761 0.000 Y2001 x 0.086 0.742
Y2008 x -0.865 0.000 Y2002 x -0.038 0.886
Y2009 x -0.732 0.000 Y2003 x -0.142 0.591
Y2010 x -0.889 0.000 Y2004 x 0.034 0.898
_cons x -12.396 0.001 Y2005 x -0.039 0.881
Y2006 x 0.028 0.915
Y2007 x 0.578 0.038
Y2008 x 1.013 0.000
Y2009 x 0.997 0.000
Y2010 x 1.063 0.000
_cons x -13.249 0.000
R-sq = 0.7978 Chi2 = 369.21
Equation 3 - Log-Log Form
R-sq = 0.9112 Chi2 = 1,136.43 R-sq = 0.9576 Chi2 = 2,097.27
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The Impact of Economic Development Tax Expenditures 
Our primary 3 Step Least Squares economic development regression found no impact, all else held 
equal, of corporate tax rates (TCorpInc) on number of large (Firms100) in a state.  This was further 
confirmed in our second and third equations, adding a degree of consistency and power to this finding.   
Similarly, taxes on those individuals making over $100,000 was not found to have a significant impact 
on the number of large firms within this sample of states, per the two equations including this variable. 
Sales taxes (Tsales) were, however, found to have a significant impact, at the 99% level, on the 
number of large firms within a state.  Within the primary log-log equation, this equated to a one 
percent increase in the sales tax in a state, all else held equal, to a .16 percent decrease in the number 
of large firms in a state.   
States with greater percentages of an employed population and those with a higher average 
workforce wage also had greater numbers of large firms.  While the first is expected – states with 
larger companies also have larger employed populations, all else held equal – the measure and direction 
of workforce wage runs counter to the business advocacy community:  for every percent increase in the 
average workforce wage, there is a resulting .45 percent increase in the number of large firms within 
that state.  With state-by-state variability accounted for within the model, this finding does run against 
the idea that large firms are solely driven to low wage locations.  This was also found to be significant at 
an even greater rate in the third equation, where state-by-state variability is not taken into 
consideration. 
Political affiliation of state bodies also, interestingly, demonstrated an impact on the number of large 
firms within a state.  While Republican majority control of both Chambers did not result in a significant 
effect in the number of large firms within a state, Republican control of the executive branch 
(governorship) did.  The effect is minimal, but significant:  for each year a Republican governor was in 
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office, for the eleven years for the eleven states, those states saw an average increase, all else held 
equal, of .026 percent of “large” businesses. 
Counter to our hypothesis, the number of Interstate miles per square mile of the state (density of 
Interstates within a state) showed a negative correlation with the number of large firms within that 
state (of .77 percent decrease for every one percent increase).  This impact reversed in equation 3, as 
individual state fixed effects were eliminated.  Thus, accounting for individual state characteristics and 
circumstances, there existed a negative correlation between the two.  This, potentially, could be 
because our equation does not take into account how, as within large states like Texas, firms may be 
located along Interstates, though those Interstates may only account for a small percentage of the 
actual landmass.  This would stand in contract to another, smaller state, such as New Jersey, which has 
multiple major Interstates running through its limited area. 
The price of industrial electricity was found to be insignificant in our primary equation. 
The amount spent on economic development tax expenditures, our variable of interest, was also 
found to be insignificant, indicating that the amount each state spends on economic development tax 
expenditures, per budgetary dollar, did not have a discernible impact, all else held equal, on the number 
of large firms in a state. 
Interestingly, for every percent increase in average farm income in a state, all else held equal, states 
sustained a decrease of .1 percent of the number of large firms.   
Further, our primary equation accounted for state differences, using a base of New York, and year 
differences, using a base of 2000.  For states, California (.582), Colorado (-2.345), Iowa (-2.135), 
Minnesota (-1.732), and Washington (-1.842) showed significance to positive and negative effects.  For 
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years, only 2002 demonstrated significance, likely resulting from the 2001-2002 recession, of -0.079 
percent of all firms, across the board, all else held equal. 
The Impact of Agricultural Development Tax Expenditures 
Our primary agricultural development found a clear, and expected, impact of crop and livestock revenue 
on farm income.  Every percent increase in crop and livestock revenue resulted in a 1.14 percent 
increase in farm income.  Corporate tax rates, workforce wages, a state’s port capacity, price of 
industrial electricity, and the number of large firms all were insignificant41.  
A full Republican controlled Executive branch and legislature was found to have a positive impact on 
farm income at the 90% level, with states having such GOP control experiencing, on average, all else 
held equal, a lift of .124 percent of income.   
States with a higher density of Interstate, unlike within economic development, did show a positive 
effect on agricultural development outcomes through farm profits.  For states with one percent more 
interstate per square mile, they experienced .188 percent greater income.   This could be, as previously 
mentioned, due to either smaller states focusing on higher margin and/or revenue products (though this 
is hopefully accounted for with CropLvskRev) or, as we had hoped to capture, being in proximity to solid 
infrastructure to get products to producers and/or market. 
Given the number of factors impacting crop and livestock revenues, a third equation was captured in 
this 3SLS model.  Within it, state and year fixed effects were calculated, accounting for each state’s 
unique characteristics and composites of agricultural products, as well as overall crop price changes, 
year over year.  Most of the state and year variables, on a base of New York for 2000, showed 
significance at least at the 90% level, with the exceptions of Iowa, Minnesota, and Ohio, and 2001. 
                                                          
41
 Firms100 did become significant at the 95% and 99% levels in equations 2 and 3, respectively, when other state-
specific factors and states-entirely, were not accounted for in the CropLvskRev model.  The other variables 
remained in significant. 
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Interestingly, for every percent increase in the population of a state, there was a 0.67 percent decrease 
in the amount of revenue received by that state’s farmers.  This clearly pushed back against the notion 
that geographic proximity to markets, as one would presume in-state farmers would have, would 
necessarily result in the ability to command higher prices, all else held equal. 
Farm size, expectedly, was positively correlated with crop and livestock revenue, almost on a one-to-
one percent basis, with every percent increase in the average farm size resulting in a one percent 
increase in revenue, all else held equal.  
As seen within this equation, the political temperament of a legislature or governorship does not show 
significance on the impact of crop and livestock revenue42.   
A state’s average temperature is only significant at an 89% level, but negatively so when state effects 
are taken into account (also taking into account how different states, based, historically on their 
weather, plant appropriate crops).  Average precipitation is significant at the 86% level, but positively.  
Both of these variables become positive and significant when state’s individual characteristics are not 
taken into account, indicating that more rain and higher temperatures, on average, all else held equal, 
are better for agricultural revenues.  These variables would likely, we presume, be better explained in a 
parabolic model. 
Our variable of interest, agricultural development tax expenditures, was found not to have a 
significant impact on agricultural revenues (in this case, our proxy for agricultural economic 
development) when state effects were taken into account.  When state effects are not taken into 
account, as within model three, the impact is small and negative, with states possibly with more 
suffering agricultural sectors perhaps relying on these incentives to a greater extent. 
                                                          
42
 The third equation, without accounting for individual state differences, does find positive significance for GOP 
legislature control. 
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Chapter V:  Discussion & Conclusions 
Regression Result Implications 
From our analysis within, from our sample of states and eleven years worth of data, we do not find 
evidence supporting the assertion that state tax expenditures have a positive impact on state 
economic or agricultural development, as measured by the change in the number of firms with greater 
than 100 employees and the net farm income and crop and livestock revenue of a state, respectively.  
This supports theoretical positions of Friedman and others, indicating that such packages, while perhaps 
impact short-term income of firms, may not result in the state-level employment outcomes desired. 
However, for economic development outcomes, sales tax rates were found to be a significant factor in 
site location.  For net farm income, the density of interstate mileage, farm size, and GOP control of all 
branches of government were all shown to be significant in contributing to growth. 
Conclusions 
In 2010, among 23 states, approximately $20.7 billion was spent on economic development tax 
expenditures.  Another $4.1 billion went to agricultural tax expenditures.  For 11 states with available 
data for an 11 year period, while aggregate economic development tax expenditure amounts have 
remained relatively constant over time (while allocation has shifted between policy priorities), 
agricultural expenditures have increased nearly fifty percent over the same period.  These tax dollars are 
given up, or spent, based upon the theory that the government can and should play a role in inducing 
private sector activity.  Our findings herein take issue with that notion, and add to the literature finding 
little, statistically significant impact of these expenditures on publicly-stated corporate attraction and 
farm incomes goals.   
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Our 3SLS regressions, besides finding no impact of economic development incentives on the number of 
large firms located in a state and no impact of agricultural development incentives on farm revenues 
(and ultimately profits) in a state, also found no impact, all else held equal, including state fixed-effects, 
that corporate taxation levels had a deleterious effect on the increase of large firms within a state.  
Another surprising result, though one that does not stand alone in the literature. 
The findings of this report, however, should not be taken to mean that all economic or agricultural 
development tax expenditures have been, and will continue to be, ineffective.  Conversely, many states, 
cities, and regions have seen demonstrated success in using such policy tools.  It has been these success 
stories, widely shared, that have driven policymakers in other communities to consider taking similar 
action and that have supported a national narrative about the importance of low-tax environments for 
business and agricultural development outcomes. 
It is the hope of this paper, however, that the reader takes away three conclusions: 
1. That proper transparency and evaluation for tax expenditures is a critical issue; 
2. That the economic dynamics at-hand are incredibly complicated and entangled with political 
and policy-advocacy dynamics that cannot – and should not – be ignored; 
3. More study of the actual effectiveness of tax expenditures (beyond interest group testimonials) 
is needed for policymakers to make informed decisions. 
Ultimately, states and communities alike must strike their own balance between hosting a low-tax (or 
targeted low-tax) environment and providing many of the services and amenities many citizens and 
potential employees desire.  That conversation is a personal one, between policy-makers and their 
constituents, but one that should be informed based upon more data, information, and analysis than is 
currently available.  
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Appendix A:  Variable Names 
 
  
Variable Description Units
AgDev_PBudgetDollar Agricultural Development Funding Per State Budget Dollar Dollars
AvgPrecip Average Annual Precipitation Inches
AvgTemp Average Annual Temperature Degrees
CA California
CO Colorado
CropLvskRev Revenue from Crop and Livestock Proceeds Dollars
EconDev_PBudgetDollar Economic Development Funding Per State Budget Dollar Dollars
EmplPop Employed Population as a Percentage of the Entire Population Percent
FarmSize Average Farm Size Acres
FL Florida
FrmInc Average Farm Net Income Dollars
GOPGov Republican Governor in Office
GOPLegGov Repubican Governor and Republican Majorities in Both Houses
GOPLegLU Republican Majorities in Both Houses
IA Iowa
IL Illinois
Interstate_sqmi Interstate miles per square mile of state land Mi per Sq Mi
MA Massachusetts
MN Minnesota
OH Ohio
PA Pennsylvania
PIndElec Price of Industrial Electricity
Pop Population
Port In-State Port Volume Tonnes
Rt2Wrk Right to Work State
TCorpInc2 State Corporate Income Tax Rate Rate
TInc100k State Income Tax Rate for Those Making $100,000 Rate
Tsales State Sales Tax Rate
WA Washington
WFWage Average Workforce Wage Dollars
Y2001 Year 2001
Y2002 Year 2002
Y2003 Year 2003
Y2004 Year 2004
Y2005 Year 2005
Y2006 Year 2006
Y2007 Year 2007
Y2008 Year 2008
Y2009 Year 2009
Y2010 Year 2010
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